Using game theory we investigate a new approach to formulate and solve optimal tolls with a focus on different policy objectives of the road authority. The aim is to gain more insight into determining optimal tolls as well as into the behavior of users after tolls have been imposed on the network. The problem of determining optimal tolls is stated and defined using utility maximization theory, including elastic demand on the travelers' side and different objectives for the road authority. Game theory notions are adopted regarding different games and players, rules and outcomes of the games played between travelers on the one hand and the road authority on the other. Different game concepts (Cournot, Stackelberg and social planner game) are mathematically formulated and the relationship between players, their payoff functions, and rules of the games are defined. The games are solved for different scenarios and different objectives for the road authority, using the Nash equilibrium concept. Using the Stackelberg game concept as being most realistic for road pricing, a few experiments are presented illustrating the optimal toll design problem subject to different pricing policies considering different objectives of the road authority. Results show different outcomes both in terms of optimal tolls as well as in payoffs for travelers. There exist multiple optimal solutions and the objective functions may have a non-continuous shape. The main contribution is the two-level separation between the network users and the road authority in terms of their objectives and influences.
Introduction and background
In recent years, researchers have become increasingly interested in the effects of introducing road pricing measures on transportation networks (see more in (1)).
The view that pricing can be one of the strategies to achieve more efficient use of transportation capacity has led to the expectation that road pricing can relieve congestion on the roads and improve the use of the transportation system. Nevertheless, road pricing is a very controversial and complex topic making it necessary to consider road pricing from different perspectives. Which objectives the road authority would like to achieve? Who is involved in decision-making and how should decisions be made? How will the travelers change their travel behavior after introducing road pricing? How will travelers interact with each other and how can the road authority influence or even control travel behavior of travelers? To answer such questions we need a flexible framework for analyzing the behavior of travelers as well as of the road authority.
Game theory provides such a framework for modeling decision-making processes in which multiple players are involved with different objectives, rules of the game, and assumptions. Considering the problem of designing optimal tolls on the network, there is a need for better insights into the interactions between travelers and the road authority, their nature, and the consequences of these interactions. Which objective the road authority will apply will have a strong influence on how, where, when and how much toll will be levied, and on its resulting welfare. The focus of this paper is on assessing different objectives a road authority may adopt and on their influence on optimal toll design.
In this paper we analyze in a game-theoretic framework a very simple route choice problem with elastic demand where road pricing is introduced. First, the roadpricing problem is formulated using game theory notions with which different games are described. After that, a game-theoretic approach is applied to formulate the road pricing game as social planner (monopoly), Stackelberg, and Cournot games, respectively. The main purpose of the experiment reported here is to show the outcomes of different games established for the optimal toll design problem. The toll setting problem is defined using flow-dependent tolls on links in a network.
Literature review

Transportation problems and game theory
Game theory first appeared in solving transportation problems in the form of so-called Wardropian equilibrium of route choice, see (2), which is similar to the Nash equilibrium of an N-player game, see (3) . For the definition of a Nash equilibrium see Section 5.
Optimal traffic control problems and game theory
In (4) for the first time different problems in transportation systems modeling are described in which a game theory approach is proposed for solution algorithms. In that paper, relationships are drawn between two game theory models based on the Nash non-cooperative and Stackelberg games.
In (5) the dynamic mixed behavior traffic network equilibrium problem is formulated as a non-cooperative N-person, non zero-sum differential game. A simple network is considered where two types of players (called user equilibrium (UE)-players and Cournot-Nash (CN)-players respectively) interact through the congestion phenomenon. A procedure to compute system optimal routings in a dynamic traffic network is introduced by (6) . Fictitious play is utilized within a game of identical interests wherein vehicles are treated as players. In the work of (7), a two-player, noncooperative game is established between the network user seeking a path to minimize its expected trip cost on the one hand, and an "evil entity" choosing link performance scenarios to maximize the expected trip cost on the other. An application of game theory to solve risk-averse user equilibrium traffic assignment can be found in (8) .
Network users have to make their route choice decisions in the presence of uncertainty about route costs reason why they need to have a strategy towards risk. In (9) a preliminary model of dynamic multi-layer infrastructure networks is presented in the form of a differential game. In particular, three network layers (car, urban freight and data) are modeled as Cournot-Nash dynamic agents. In (10) the integrated traffic control and dynamic traffic assignment problem is presented as a non-cooperative game between the traffic authority and highway users. The objective of the combined control-assignment problem is to find dynamic system optimal signal settings and dynamic user-optimal traffic flows. The combined control-assignment problem is first formulated as a single-level Cournot game: the traffic authority and the users choose their strategies simultaneously. Then, the combined problem is formulated as a bilevel Stackelberg game in which the traffic authority is the leader who determines the signal settings in anticipation of the user's responses.
Road pricing problems and game theory
The problem of determining optimal tolls in transportation networks is a complex issue. In (11) the question what happens when jurisdictions have the opportunity to establish tollbooths at the frontier separating them is examined. If one jurisdiction would be able to set his policy in a vacuum it is clearly advantageous to impose as high a toll on non-residents as can be supported. However, the neighboring jurisdiction can set a policy in response. This establishes the potential for a classical prisoner's dilemma consideration: in this case to tax (cooperate) or to toll (defect). In There is a lack in the literature about the importance of different policies the road authority may adopt, and outcomes that can be result of the different objectives and games played with the travelers. Therefore, different policy objectives of the road authority in the optimal toll design problem as well as different game concepts consequences will be the focus of this paper.
Problem statement (non-cooperative game theory)
The interactions between travelers and the road authority can be seen as a noncooperative, non-zero sum, (N+1) players game between a single traffic authority on the one side and N network users (travelers) on the other. The objective of the roadpricing problem, which is the combined optimal toll design and traffic assignment problem, is to find system-optimal tolls and user-optimal traffic flows simultaneously.
This road-pricing is an example of a bi-level optimization problem. The userequilibrium traffic assignment problem (lower level problem) can be formulated as non-cooperative, N-person, non-zero-sum game solved as a Nash game. The upper level problem may have different objectives depending on what the road authority would like to achieve. This question will be the focus of this paper.
A conceptual framework for the optimal toll design problem in case of elastic demand addressed from different road authority's objectives is given in Figure 1 . Figure 1 Conceptual framework for optimal toll design with route and trip choice The road authority sets tolls on the network while travelers respond to tolls by changing their travel decisions. Depending on travel costs, they can decide to travel along a certain route or decide not to travel at all in the tolled network.
Lower level
Change
In the road-pricing problem, we are dealing with an N+1-player game, where there are N players (travelers) making a travel choice decision, and one player (the road manager) making a control or design decision (in this case, setting road tolls).
Adding the traffic authority to the game is not as simple as extending an N-player game to an N+1 player game, because the strategy space and the payoff function for this additional player differs from the rest of the N players. In fact, there are two games played in conjunction with each other. The first game is a non-cooperative game where all N travelers aim to maximize their individual utility by choosing the best travel strategy (i.e. trip choice and route choice), taking into account all other travelers' strategies. The second game is between the travelers and the road manager, where the road manager aims to maximize some network performance by choosing a control strategy, taking into account that travelers respond to the control strategy by adapting their travel strategies. The two games can be described as follows:
The outer level game, being the toll design problem, consisting of the following elements:
1. Players: the authority on the one side and N potential travelers on the other; 2. Rule 1: the authority sets the tolls taking the travelers' behavior into account as well as possible restrictions on the toll levels in order to optimize a certain objective. 
3.
Outcome of the game: a) optimal strategies for the travelers (trip and route decisions), b) payoff for the travelers (utilities)
Our main focus in this paper is to investigate the outer level game between the road authority and users, although the inner level game between travelers is part of it.
Model structure
The objectives of the road authority and the travelers are different and sometimes even opposite. The upper level objective may be to minimize total travel time, to relieve congestion, to improve safety, to raise revenue, to improve total system utility, or anything else. The lower level objective may be the individual travel time, travel cost, or the individual travel utility. In this paper, we use the individual travel utility as the objective to maximize for travelers.
Since the purpose of this paper is to gain more insight into the structure of the optimal toll design problem under different policy objectives by using game theory, we restrict ourselves to the case of a very simple network in which only one origin- For the sake of simplicity we assume the deterministic utility case without a random error term.. For more elaborate definitions, see (14) . 
Game theory applied to road pricing
. 
where c is defined in expression (1) and U in expression (2). 
If Equations (4) and (5) are satisfied for all (N+1) players, where
, then this is a Nash equilibrium in which no player can be better off by unilaterally following another strategy. Although all equilibria use the Nash concept, a different equilibrium or game type can be defined in the N+1-player game depending on the influence each of the players has in the game. Game theory notions used in this paper are adopted from work of (15).
Different game concepts
In the following we will distinguish three different types of games between the road authority and the travelers, namely, Monopoly, Stackelberg and Cournot game, respectively.
Social planner game
In this case, the road manager not only sets its own control, but is also assumed able to control the strategies that the travelers will play. In other words, the road manager 
Stackelberg game
In this case, the road manager is the 'leader' by setting the control, thereby directly influencing the travelers that are considered to be 'followers'. The travelers may only indirectly influence the road manager by making travel decisions based on the control.
It is assumed that the road manager has complete knowledge of how travelers respond to control measures. The road manager sets 
Different objectives of the road authority
Which objective the road authority will apply will have influence on the optimal toll levels. Depending on the authority's objective, different utility payoff functions can be formulated.
Assuming the road authority's objective of maximizing total travel utility (the utility of all network users together), the objective is defined as the sum of the payoff values of all travelers:
.
In case the road authority aims at maximizing total toll revenues, the following objective may be used: s Clearly, setting tolls equal to zero does not provide any revenues, while setting very high tolls will make all travelers decide not to travel at all.
Combining these two objectives leads to the notion of social surplus maximization. The social surplus can be computed by adding the toll revenues to the total trip utilities, such that the following problem will maximize social surplus as an objective:
max ( ) 
A few experiments
Let us now look at the following simple problem to illustrate how the roadpricing problem can be analyzed using game theory. Suppose there are two individuals wanting to travel from A to B. There are two alternative routes available to go to B. The first route is tolled (toll is equal to θ ), the second route is untolled.
Depending on the toll level, the travelers decide to take either route 1 or route 2, or not to travel at all. The latter choice is represented by a third virtual route, such that we can consider three route alternatives as available strategies to each traveler, i.e.
for traveler i = 1,2. Figure 2 illustrates the problem. Each strategy yields a different payoff, depending on the utility to make the trip, the travel time on the route (that increases whenever more travelers use it) and a possible route toll. We assume that traveler i aims to maximize its individual travel utility (payoff,) given by
In Equation (5), U represents the trip utility when making the trip to destination B (in the calculations we assume U =210), ( ) rs p τ ⋅ denotes the route travel time for route r depending on the chosen strategies, while α represents the value of time (we assume 6 α = for all travelers). Note that negative net utilities on route 1 and 2 imply that one will not travel, i.e. if the cost (disutility) of making the trip is larger than the utility of the trip itself. The route travel times are given as a function of the chosen strategies in the sense that the more travelers use a certain route, the higher the travel time: Solving the game between the two travelers for a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a Wardrop equilibrium with elastic demand, in which no traveler can improve his/her utility by unilaterally changing route or deciding not to travel. For the sake of clarity we will only look at pure strategies in this example, but the case may be extended to mixed strategies as well. In pure strategies, each player is assumed to adopt only one strategy, whereas in mixed strategies, the players are assumed to adopt probabilities for choosing each of the available strategies. In our example we are thus looking at discrete flows instead of continuous flows so that. Wardrop's first principle according to which all travel utilities are equal for all used alternatives may no longer hold in this case. In fact, the more general equilibrium rule applies in which each traveler aims to maximize his personal trip utility. The utility payoff table, depending on the toll , θ is given in Table 1 In the experiments we will consider three different road authority's objectives: total travel utility, social surplus, and generating revenues. For the first objective, three different game concepts are applied: social planner, Stackelberg and Cournot game, respectively. Because Stackelberg game is the most realistic game and, we apply only Stackelberg game for the other two objective functions.
CASE STUDY 1: maximize total TRAVEL utility
Now, let us add the road manager as a player, assuming that he tries to maximize total travel utility, i.e.
Max ( )
The strategy set of the road manager is assumed to be { | 0}.
The payoffs for the road manager are presented in Table 2 depending on the strategy θ ∈ Θ that the road manager plays and depending on the strategies the travelers play. 
Social planner game
In the social planner game, the road manager sets the toll as well as the travel decisions of the travelers such that his payoff is maximized. Note that the travel utility always decreases as θ increases, hence 
Cournot game
It can be shown that in case the travelers and the road manager have equal influence on each others strategies, multiple Cournot solutions exist. There is however one dominating strategy, being that the travelers both take route 1 and that the road manager sets zero tolls, yielding a total system utility of 204. 
DY 2: Maximize Social Surplus
r is assumed to maximize social surplus (see formula (11) ). The
CASE STU
Now, the road manage strategy set of the road manager is assumed to be { | 0}.
The payoffs for the road manager are presented in Table 4 depending on the strategy θ ∈ Θ that the road manager plays and depending on the strategies the travelers play. 
Conclusions and further extensions
The purpose of the paper was to gain more insight into the road-pricing problem using concepts from game theory as well as different toll designs depending on different objectives. To that end we presented the notions of game theory and presented three different game types in order to elucidate the essentials of the game theoretic approach. These game types were applied to three different toll design objectives exemplified on a simplistic demand-supply network system. This clearly revealed differences in design results in terms of toll levels and payoffs for involved actors, 
